Recent work on introspection has threatened to undermine (a) the intuitive assumption that we can have introspective knowledge of our own minds; and (b) the core methodology of the scientific study of consciousness. I articulate and defend an approach to introspection which champions both (a) and (b). My position seeks to recognize and respect many of the worries about introspective knowledge found in the literature; but it also seeks to provide a principled reason – beyond common sense intuition – in support of the view that we have introspective knowledge. That reason turns on the way that certain introspective judgements help to explain our possession of ordinary abilities. I show how the resulting view can be used to pin down both the scope and content of introspective knowledge, and, in light of this, how it provides a strategy for calibrating introspection as such. In turn this will establish introspection as a scientifically respectable source of data about consciousness.